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Barry Gough. Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the Admiralty.
Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2017. Pp. 600.
Barry Gough’s new book Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the
Admiralty is an important contribution to the already voluminous
literature on both of these figures. Examining Winston Churchill
and Admiral John Fisher’s relationship and the naval developments
of the first two decades of the twentieth century helps give new
perspective on each man’s personality and the positions they took
on important issues. The book is a well-written narrative history of
the era, aimed at both scholars and members of the public who are
interested in naval history, Fisher or Churchill. However, the book
could have dealt more with the role that the culture of the Royal
Navy (RN) had on each man’s career. Similarly, the imperial context
of both men’s lives is more hinted at than examined in a systematic
manner. Nonetheless, Gough’s book will provide new insights into
the period for even the most knowledgeable scholar of the era.
Churchill and Fisher builds on the extensive naval historiography
of the period and some of the immense body of literature on Churchill.
In particular Gough cites the approach of Arthur Marder in his five
volume From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow as a major inspiration. As
such, he argues that a narrative approach to history, which emphasises
the role of personality and contingency, best captures the naval
developments of the early twentieth century (pp. xiii-xix). Following
this approach allows Gough to place his extensive primary research
at the heart of his argument. Gough’s use of the personal papers of
the Second Viscount Esher, who was a close friend of Fisher and
at the centre of British political society, is particularly illuminating.
Scholars of the period will almost certainly find documents or
quotations that they have not seen before and so will likely follow the
extensive endnotes very closely.
Churchill and Fisher begins with three chapters covering Fisher’s
early career, and his time at the Admiralty. Gough adds nuance to
the historical genesis of a number of Fisher’s reforms, showing, for
instance, that Lord Selborne was a key player in the development
of personnel reforms. Gough argues that “Fisher was essentially a
democrat” and thus improving the conditions for the lower decks
was an important concern for him (p. 82). He goes on to argue that
the overall officer culture of the RN was the key reason that Fisher’s
personnel reforms met such resistance. Gough suggests that the main
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thrust of these reforms was to professionalise the RN’s officer corps
and make it more open to those of a variety of social backgrounds.
The well-known feud between Fisher and Admiral Charles
Beresford is set into the context of the wider opposition within the
navy to Fisher’s reforms. Gough also argues that Fisher’s methods
of leadership were also partly to blame for the resistance (p. 104).
Gough shows the complexity of the dispute and effectively makes
the case that it was far more than a personal feud. The ongoing
disagreement eventually split the navy and became a subject of
political controversy, resulting in Fisher’s early retirement. The
book’s description of the dispute skillfully balances the importance
of Fisher’s reforms to the RN as it was modernised along with his
more unscrupulous and controversial actions. The hints that Gough
provides about the nature of the culture of the RN around the turn
of the century are tantalising and this reviewer wishes that they had
been more fully developed.
The development of Dreadnought and Invincible are discussed,
though Gough contends that Fisher saw submarines as more
revolutionary in their impact on naval warfare. This fact was only
grasped by a few contemporaries, including Churchill. Churchill enters
Gough’s story towards the end of his discussion of Fisher’s tenure as
First Sea Lord, often in connection with Churchill’s opposition to
large Naval Estimates. He effectively illustrates how Churchill and
Fisher’s relationship grew from one where Fisher was highly skeptical
of Churchill’s intentions towards the navy into one where Churchill
became Fisher’s pupil in naval affairs.
Gough’s treatment of Churchill is also even-handed. He gives
Churchill credit for his effective handling of the buildup of the RN
during his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill is in turn
criticised for the limited naval staff system that proved insufficient
for the demands that modern naval warfare placed on it. Churchill’s
tendency to ignore well-reasoned opposition and out-argue his
opponents is also explored and emerges as one of the key reasons for
Churchill and Fisher’s split over the Dardanelles campaign.
Gough’s discussion of Churchill’s role in deploying the RN at
the beginning of the First World War again demonstrates his careful
documentary research. In spite of Churchill’s well-known claim
that he was the one that ordered the British fleet to stay mobilised
following summer exercises, Gough shows that it was actually First
Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg who ordered that the fleet not

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/16

2

Walton: Review of "Churchill and Fisher" by Barry Gough
56

Book Reviews

be demobilised and that Churchill merely approved the order when
he returned to London after a weekend away (pp. 211-212). Though
Gough is not always so careful in his research, such as when he
somewhat inexplicably states that Room 40, the RN’s code-breaking
operation, was “in a quiet wing of the Old Admiralty Building,” when
in fact it was located in the same corridor as the Admiralty Board
Room and the First Sea Lord’s office.1
The early months of the First World War demonstrated Churchill’s
interest in offensive military operations such as his leadership of the
defence of Antwerp, which Gough says “did him little credit” (p. 257).
Fisher was recalled to the admiralty in November 1914 and initially
worked well with Churchill as both men shared a strong desire to use
the navy in offensive operations. However, in spite of early promise,
Churchill and Fisher were ill-suited to working together as both men
wanted supreme control of naval operations in their own hands. Fisher
complained repeatedly to friends about Churchill circumventing his
authority by privately writing to fleet commanders.
The Dardanelles operation looms large in any historical discussion
of Churchill and Fisher and Gough helps to untangle who originated
the idea of the operation and each man’s role in either pushing
it forward or opposing it.2 Gough carefully pieces together how
Churchill and Fisher’s working relationship broke down during the
planning of the Dardanelles. In late 1914 both Churchill and Fisher
were initially intrigued by the possibility of forcing the Dardanelles
by naval means alone. However, as Churchill and the Cabinet became
increasingly fixed on forcing the Dardanelles by naval means alone,
Fisher’s concerns about the operation grew, though he only expressed
his reservations privately. As the naval attack on the Dardanelles
commenced, Churchill had essentially assumed operational command

1  
Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 15.
2  
The historiography on the Dardanelles and Gallipoli is massive; some recent
highlights include Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and the Dardanelles (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), which provides a balanced account of Churchill’s role
in the Dardanelles Campaign. For a more critical and less balanced assessment of
Churchill’s role in the Dardanelles campaign, see Tom Curran, The Grand Deception:
Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (Newport, Australia: Big Sky Publishing,
2015). For a recent examination of British planning of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli
campaign more broadly, see Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
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of the navy, displacing both Fisher and the Chief of the Naval Staff
in the process.
Fisher was concerned by what he saw as the weakening of naval
forces in the decisive theatre of the North Sea and the other Sea
Lords shared his concern. As the landings at Gallipoli were checked,
Fisher stepped up his opposition to the operation. At the War Council
meeting of 14 May 1915, Fisher stated directly to the leaders of
the British government his objections to the Dardanelles operation
and said he had been against it from the beginning. Churchill then
defended the operation in the Dardanelles, “but it was readily clear to
all present that a deep...fissure existed between Fisher and Churchill
over the operation” (p. 376). Fisher walked out of the Admiralty the
next day, writing resignation letters to Churchill and Prime Minister
Herbert Asquith. Gough does an excellent job carefully tracing
Fisher’s actions during these critical days when he refused to return
to the Admiralty in spite of a direct order from the Prime Minister
to do so. Gough rightfully condemns the manner of Fisher’s exit from
the Admiralty as irresponsible. Fisher’s resignation also set in motion
the events that would lead to Churchill’s removal as First Lord and
a new coalition government.
Gough’s book makes important modifications to the story of
Churchill and especially Fisher. His even-handed treatment of both
men shows both at their best and worst, and Gough praises and
criticises in equal measure in this balanced portrayal of each man.
One or two factual errors aside, the only weaknesses in the book are
a lack of a more thorough discussion of the RN’s culture during the
early twentieth century and the links between that culture and the
wider world of the British Empire, though the latter is covered in
some detail by Gough’s own Pax Britannica (2014). However, these
concerns do not substantially diminish the value of this book as a
work of immense scholarship.
james walton , queen ’ s university
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